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This paper addresses the question whether future contingents are
knowable, that is, whether one can know that things will go a certain
way even though it is possible that things will not go that way. First I
will consider a long-established view that implies a negative answer,
and draw attention to some endemic problems that affect its credibility.
Then I will sketch an alternative line of thought that prompts a positive
answer: future contingents are knowable, although our epistemic
access of them is limited in some important respects.
1 the knowability thesis
Let us start with two simple observations that may easily look obvious
to anyone who is not familiar with the subleties of the debate on future
contingents. The first is that in some cases it seems that we know that
things will go a certain way. The following examples illustrate such
cases.
Case 1. Suppose that I set my alarm clock at 6 am because tomorrow
I have to catch a train that departs at 8 am. Tonight, before going to
bed, I murmur
(1) Tomorrow I’ll wake up early
Understandably, this verbal expression conveys a fairly high degree
of confidence. I have reasons to believe that tomorrow at 6 am my
phone will emit a distinctive sound, I have reasons to believe that, if
my phone will emit that sound, then I will wake up, and so on. On
the face of it, these reasons justify my conviction that tomorrow I’ll
wake up early, which makes it plausible to say that I know (1).1
Case 2. Suppose that you got a ticket for a movie and you are
talking with a friend who might be interested in joining you. After
reading ‘9 pm’ on the ticket, you tell her
1 Here and in the rest of the paper there is no need to be fussy about the distinction
between sentences and what they express. When I say that I know (1), I mean that I
know the content expressed by (1).
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(2) The movie will start at 9 pm
As before, you are fairly confident that the movie will start at 9 pm,
given that you can trust your eyesight, you reasonably believe that the
information on the ticket is reliable, and so on. This makes it plausible
to say that you know (2).
Case 3. Suppose that Mr Brown is a methodical old man who likes
going out for a walk every morning at 10 am. His neighbour, Mrs
Green, regularly sees him leaving his house. At 9:50 am, while sitting
by her window, Mrs Green makes the following statement:
(3) In about 10 minutes he will go out
Apparently, Mrs Green has a justification for thinking that Mr Brown
will show up as expected: she is aware that Mr Brown is methodical,
she has observed many of his past walks, and so on. This makes it
plausible to say that Mrs Green knows (3).
The second observation is that, usually, the cases in which it seems
that we know that things will go a certain way are cases in which
there is a possibility, however remote, that things will not go that way.
For example, in case 1 a tsetse fly could bite me during the night and
cause me to sleep until noon. Similarly, in case 2 the projectionist
could be late, and in case 3 Mr Brown could receive an unexpected
visit. Of course, normally we do not think about such possibilities, in
that we tend to restrict attention to a limited range of options. But
this does not prevent them from existing. It is possible that a tsetse fly
bites me during the night, no matter whether I think about it before
going to bed.
In other words, the possibility of error is to be understood in terms
of objective chance, rather than in terms of subjective or epistemic
probability. So, the point does not directly concern claims such as the
following:
(4) I know that I will wake up early and it might be that I will not
If ‘might’ and similar epistemic modals encode an epistemic or sub-
jective notion of probability which differs from the objective notion
of chance, as is widely assumed, then the second observation does
not entail that (4) is true. To say that knowledge of future events is
compatible with some chance of error is not the same thing as to say
that it is compatible with some epistemic or subjective probability of
error, even though it might indeed be compatible with the latter as
well.2
The two observations just outlined, taken together, suggest that fu-
ture contingents are knowable. That is, they suggest that the following
holds for some content p expressed by a future-tense sentence:
(K) There are cases in which one knows p and p is contingent
2 Hawthorne and Lasonen-Aarnio [10] makes this point clear.
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So it is quite natural to wonder whether (K) can be retained as part of
a coherent theory of future contingents.
Although (K) is initially plausible, or at least not patently wrong,
its implications may easily give rise to doubts and misgivings. On
the standard assumption that knowledge is factive, (K) entails that
some contingent p is true. This contradicts the widely held thesis that
future contingency is incompatible with truth, call it incompatibilism.
That is, (K) is at odds with the conjunction of the following claims:
(F) If one knows p, then p is true
(I) If p is contingent, then p is not true
Take any contingent p. Given (I), p is not true. Given (F), it follows
by contraposition that one does not know p. So it seems that, as long
as (F) is granted, (K) and (I) cannot stand together. However, I will
argue that this is not a good reason to reject (K). The idea that future
contingents are knowable, once properly spelled out, proves to be
reasonably safe.
The considerations about (K) and (I) presented in the next sections
overlap at least in part with considerations that have recently been
advanced about the assertibility of future contingents. It is easy to see
that the following thesis draws its initial plausibility from the very
same kind of examples that speak in favour of (K):
(A) There are cases in which p is assertible and p is contingent
For example, (1)-(3) seem assertible in the situations described above.
(A) clashes with (I) on the assumption that assertibility is factive: if
(A) entails that some contingent p is true, then it contradicts (I). As
Hattiangadi and Besson have convincingly argued, the clash between
(A) and (I) is not a good reason to reject (A).3
Although the issue of assertibility will not be discussed here, it may
be noted that the rejection of (K) causes the same kind of troubles that
arise in connection with the rejection of (A), which suggests that some
basic conceptual relation holds between (K) and (A). At least three
distinct accounts of assertibility can substantiate this suggestion. One
option is to define assertibility in terms of truth, by saying that one
can assert p only if p is true.4 A second option is define assertibility
in terms of justification, by saying that one can assert p only if one
is justified in believing p.5 A third option is to define assertibility in
terms of knowledge, by saying that one can assert p only if one knows
p.6 In each of these three cases, (K) warrants (A), in that knowing p
3 Hattiangadi and Besson [9], [6]. (A) has been extensively discussed in the literature
on future contingents, see for example Belnap [26], MacFarlane [20], Stojanovic [35],
MacFarlane [22], Santelli [32].
4 A recent attempt to defend this account is Weiner [42].
5 This account is developed in different ways in Lackey [15], Kvanvig [14], Neta [27].
6 This account is advocated in Williamson [43].
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implies that the condition for asserting p is satisfied. However, for our
purposes there is no need to spell out the relation between (K) and
(A). So it will suffice to observe that there is an interesting parallelism
between the issue of knowledge and the issue of assertibility.
2 incompatibilism and the difference problem
In chapter 9 of De interpretatione Aristotle famously argued that future
contingents are neither true nor false. His point was that if a sentence
such as (1)-(3) were true, then it would be already settled that the event
described will occur, and if it were false, then it would be already
settled that the event described will not occur. In neither of the two
cases the event described would be contingent.7
Many contemporary authors agree with Aristotle on this point.
The idea that future contingency rules out bivalence underlies several
accounts of future-tense sentences. One of them is supervaluationism,
the theory developed by Van Fraassen and Thomason, which rests on
the idea that future-tense sentences can be evaluated as true or false
relative to possible futures. Let a history be a whole possible course
of events. Supervaluationism assumes that, for any p, there is a set
of “accessible” histories such that in each of them p is either true or
false. Truth in the non-relative sense — truth simpliciter — is defined
in terms of truth relative to histories: p is true if and only if it is true
in all histories, and false if and only if it is false in all histories. This
definition entails that future contingents are neither true nor false. For
example, (1) is neither true nor false because it is true in a history in
which I wake up at 6 am but false in a history in which I sleep until
noon.8
Another theory, due to Belnap, Perloff, and Xu, implies that there
is no such thing as truth simpliciter. Future contingents are true or false
only relative to histories, because it is only relative to histories that they
express a truth-evaluable content. Suppose that (1) is uttered today.
Since at the moment of the utterance different futures are possible,
each of which includes a different tomorrow, the word ‘tomorrow’
in (1) does not denote a determinate moment. So it makes no sense
to ask whether (1) is true or false. The only meaningful question
that can be asked is whether (1) is true or false relative to a given
history. This theory shares with supervaluationism the assumption
that future-tense sentences can be evaluated as true or false relative to
possible futures, but does not identify truth simpliciter with truth in
all histories.9
7 Or at least, this is a widely accepted reading of Aristotle [1] 18b23 ff.
8 Van Fraassen [40], Thomason [36]. For the sake of simplicity, here and in what follows
I will not mention the moment parameter, that is, I will talk about truth relative to
histories rather than about truth at moments relative to histories.
9 Belnap, Perloff and Xu [26].
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A third theory, proposed by MacFarlane, shares with the second
the claim that there is no such thing as truth simpliciter, but in this case
the idea is that a parameter of evaluation other than the history has
to be taken into account. According to MacFarlane, the truth value of
a future contingent uttered at a given moment can vary depending
on the context of assessment, that is, on the moment in which it is
evaluated. Suppose that (1) is uttered today and that I wake up early
tomorrow. Today, at the moment of the utterance, (1) is neither true nor
false. But tomorrow, once awake, (1) is true. So the same sentence, as
uttered at a given moment, can have different truth values in different
contexts of assessment.10
The three theories just outlined fall under the umbrella of incom-
patibilism because they entail that future contingents are not true.
Surely, they do not exhaust the space under the umbrella. For exam-
ple, Łukasiewicz’s three-valued logic develops the Aristotelian idea in
a different way. Moreover, the theory that all future contingents are
all false, traditionally attributed to Peirce, entails incompatibilism as
well: if p is false in virtue of being contingent, then (I) holds. But for
our purposes there is no need to go any further. The discussion that
follows concern incompatibilism in general, so it does not depend on
specific features of this or that theory.11
As we have seen, if (I) is maintained, (K) must be rejected. This is
to say that a sentence of the form ‘A knows p’ turns out false whenever
p is contingent. However, the rejection of (K) has a price. The problem
is that the cases such as 1-3 seem to differ from those in which we are
typically inclined to say that we do not know what will happen. For
each of the three sentences below, it is easy to imagine circumstances
in which we lack knowledge of the event predicted:
(5) The coin will land heads
(6) My team will win 3-1
(7) One week from now it will not rain
Imagine that the coin denoted in (5) is fair, that (6) is about the next
Champions League Final, and that (7) is uttered in Britain. In such
circumstances (5)-(7) are not justified, for there is no adequate evidence
for thinking that they are true. In this respect, (1)-(3) clearly differ
from (5)-(7).12
The difference problem may be phrased in general terms as follows:
if the ascriptions of knowledge involving future contingents are all
equally false, then what explains the intuitive difference between the
10 MacFarlane [20], MacFarlane [21].
11 Łukasiewicz [19]. Peirceanism goes back to Prior [30], and is defended in Todd [37].
12 Note also that (5)-(7) are clearly not assertible, which makes perfect sense on the
assumption that assertibility requires justification.
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cases in which it seems that we know that things will go a certain way
and those in which it seems that we lack such knowledge?13
In order to appreciate the pervasiveness of the problem it must
be noted that ‘false’ could be replaced by ‘untrue’ in the formulation
above. Although our discussion will focus on the claim that the
ascriptions of knowledge involving future contingents are all equally
false — obtained by reasoning from (I) and (F) to the negation of
(K) — the same problem arises in connection with the claim that the
ascriptions of knowledge involving future contingents are all equally
indeterminate. This fact is important because a possible move available
to the incompatibilist is to block that reasoning by rejecting (F) and
arguing that factivity is to be phrased as follows:
(F*) If one knows p, then p14
If one replaces (F) with (F*), one may claim that (K) is not false, even
though it is indeterminate that one knows p whenever p is contingent.
But the problem remains, because we are still without an explanation
of the intuitive difference between the cases in which it seems that we
know that things will go a certain way and those in which it seems
that we lack such knowledge.
This remark also applies to the view advocated by Barnes and
Cameron, according to which it is metaphysically indeterminate what
will happen: for every contingent p, it is determinately the case that
p is either true or false, although it is indeterminate which. Barnes
and Cameron do not hold a definite position on the question whether
future contingents are knowable, and observe that their view is com-
patible with at least two options. One is that future contingents are
not knowable: if p is indeterminate, one cannot know p. The other
is that the ascriptions of knowledge of future contingents inherit the
indeterminacy of future contingents themselves: if p is indeterminate,
so is ‘A knows p’. Both options face the difference problem: no matter
whether the ascriptions of knowledge involving future contingents are
taken to be all false or all indeterminate, it has to be explained why
some of them seem true while others seem false.15
The challenge posed by the difference problem is evident. A brute
error theory according to which ‘A knows p’ is always false when p is
contingent would be hard to swallow, unless it were acompanied by a
plausible explanation of why ‘A knows p’ seems true in some cases.
Sections 3-5 examine three distinct routes that the incompatibilist
might take in order to account for the intuitive difference between
(1)-(3) and (5)-(7). As we shall see, each of these three routes is more
problematic than it may appear at first sight.
13 Unless, of course, one wants to deny that in the cases of the first kind the event
described is really contingent, as in Scheer [33].
14 Todd and Rabern [38], pp. 8-9, discusses the distinction between (F) and (F*) in
connection with the issue of divine omniscience.
15 Barnes and Cameron [3], pp. 23-24.
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3 different content
The first option is to describe the cases in which ‘A knows p’ seems
true as cases in which A knows some other content q which can easily
be mistaken for p. More precisely, the incompatibilist might claim that
‘A knows p’ is elliptical, in that the real content of A’s knowledge is
more complex than it appears.
According to one version of this strategy, the real content of A’s
knowledge is not p itself but the proposition that p is probable, so
the cases in which ‘A knows p’ seems true are correctly described as
cases in which ‘A knows that p is probable’ is true. For example, the
intuitive contrast between (1) and (5) can be explained in terms of the
difference between (8) and (9):
(8) It is probable that tomorrow I’ll wake up early
(9) It is probable that the coin will land heads
On the reasonable assumption that I know (8), my apparent knowledge
of (1) can be explained in terms of my knowledge of (8). Similarly, on
the reasonable assumption that I do not know (9), my apparent lack of
knowledge of (5) can be explained in terms of my lack of knowledge
of (9).16
According to another version of this strategy, the real content of
A’s knowledge is a conditional whose consequent is p and whose
antecedent rules out unforeseen circumstances, such as tsetse flies, de-
lays, or unexpected visits. For example, the intuitive contrast between
(1) and (5) can be explained in terms of the difference between (10)
and (11):
(10) If nothing very unlikely happens, tomorrow I’ll wake up early
(11) If nothing very unlikely happens, the coin will land heads
As in the previous case, it is reasonable to assume that I know (10) but
I do not know (11).17
Note that (10) and (11) cannot be understood as material condition-
als, because the incompatibilist denies that (1) and (5) are true or false.
Neither can they be treated as truth-functional trivalent conditionals,
for in that case, no matter how the truth-table is defined, they would
have the same value as long as (1) and (5) have the same value. The
incompatibilist should rather opt for a possible-worlds account accord-
ing to which (10) differs from (11) because its consequent is true in
16 MacFarlane [22], p. 231, suggests that future-tense sentences can be “clarified” along
these lines. Moss [25], pp. 53-58, argues that simple sentences, including future-tense
sentences such as (1) and (5), typically convey probabilistic contents, and suggests
that the ascriptions of knowledge that employ simple sentences are to be understood
accordingly.
17 MacFarlane [22], p. 231, also suggest a reformulation along these lines.
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some relevant set of histories in which its antecedent is true, or for a
probabilistic account according to which (10) differs from (11) because
the conditional probability of its consequent given its antecedent is
high.
No matter whether the content ascribed to A is probabilistic or con-
ditional, however, the claim that ‘A knows p’ is elliptical in the sense
explained faces at least three problems. We will focus on the prob-
abilistic reformulation to illustrate these problems, although similar
considerations hold for the conditional reformulation.
The first problem is that, in order for the proposed explanation to
be minimally credible, it must be generally true that ‘A knows p’ is to
be read as ‘A knows that p is probable’. This claim needs be motivated
by independent reasons, and it is an open issue whether such reasons
can be provided. More specifically, the proposed explanation implies
an unlikely asymmetry between future-tense sentences and past-tense
sentences, for it does not seem generally true that, when an ascription
of knowledge is made by embedding a simple past-tense sentence, the
knowledge ascribed has a probabilistic content. If I say that yesterday
I woke up early, it seems that I literally know what I say, that is, what I
know is not merely that it is probable that yesterday I woke up early.18
Note that this problem does not depend on some specific trait of
ascriptions of knowledge, and may equally be raised in connection
with the claim that ‘A asserts p’ is to be rephrased as ‘A asserts that p is
probable’. For example, if I say that yesterday I woke up early, it seems
that my assertion is to be taken literally, rather than as an assertion
that it is probable that yesterday I woke up early. Hattiangadi and
Besson have argued against this latter claim by appealing to indirect
speech reports.19
The second problem concerns future-directed states other than
knowledge. If it were generally true that ‘A knows p’ is to be read as
‘A knows that p is probable’, then it would be natural to expect that the
same kind of paraphrase applies to ascriptions of other future-directed
states, as long as their contents are described by means of the same
sentences. But it seems instead that the most plausible reading of such
ascriptions is literal. Imagine that I murmur (1) and that my partner,
who does not trust my hearing or my determination, says: “I hope
so”. What does my partner hope? Clearly, she hopes that tomorrow
I’ll wake up early. She does not hope that it is probable that tomorrow
I’ll wake up early, because that hope is fulfilled even if I remain in
bed and miss my train. The reformulation strategy seems to entail
either that the most natural ascription of hope to my partner is wrong,
18 Of course it might be argued that any simple sentence expresses different contents
in different contexts, and only in some of them it expreses a probabilistic content.
But some explanation woud still be needed of why in a given context a future-
tense simple sentence expresses a probabilistic content whereas the corresponding
past-tense sentence do not express such a content.
19 Hattiangadi and Besson [9], p. 267, [6], pp. 495-496.
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or that (1) has different readings depending of whether it is used to
ascribe knowledge or hope.
The third problem concerns retrospective ascriptions of knowledge.
Suppose that Mrs Green utters (3) at 9:50 am during a conversation
with a friend, and that 10 minutes later Mr Brown, punctual as always,
opens his door and walks out. In this case it seems that Mrs Green
can say to her friend: “I knew it! Didn’t I tell you?”. If we take Mrs
Green’s words at face value, what she says is that at 9:50 she knew that
Mr Brown would have gone out. Now consider an unlikely parallel
scenario in which Mr Brown remains at home because he receives an
unexpected visit. In this situation it seems that Mrs Green cannot say
the same thing at 10 am. The obvious reason is that, although in both
cases Mrs Green was justified in believing (3) at 9:50 am, in the second
case she did not know (3). If instead the real content of Mrs Green’s
belief concerned the probability of Mr Brown’s walk, then no such
distinction could be drawn between the two cases, for in both cases
Mrs Green knew at 9:50 that Mr Brown’s walk was probable.
Note that, as in the case of the first problem, the same trouble
arises in connection with the claim that ‘A asserts p’ is to be rephrased
as ‘A asserts that p is probable’. If Mrs Green utters (3) at 9:50 am,
and Mr Brown goes out at 10 am, then Mrs Green’s friend can say:
“You were right!”, meaning that the assertion made by Mrs Green at
9:50 was correct. The same statement would be inappropriate in the
parallel scenario in which Mr Brown receives an unexpected visit.
4 different state or property
The second option is to describe the cases in which ‘A knows p’ seems
true as cases in which some non-factive epistemic state or property
holds for p. At least three versions of this strategy are foreseeable.
The first is to say that p is merely believed instead of being known, so
the intuitive contrast between (1) and (5) is explained by observing
that I believe (1) while I do not believe (5). The second is to say that
p is merely justified instead of being known, so the intuitive contrast
between (1) and (5) is explained by observing that (1), unlike (5), is
justified. The third is to say that p is merely probable instead of being
known, so the intuitive contrast between (1) and (5) is explained by
observing that (1), unlike (5), is probable.20
No matter which of the three versions of the strategy is adopted,
the proposed explanation implies a general claim about ascriptions of
knowledge involving future contingents. In order for such a claim to
be minimally credible, it must be generally true that ‘A knows p’ is to
be replaced by ‘A believes p’, ‘p is justified’, or ‘p is probable’. As in
20 Note that the third proposal differs from the probabilistic version of the first option
because it implies no revisionary claim about content, that is, no content other than p
is involved in the explanation.
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the case of the first option, it is not clear why we should assume that
future-tense sentences differ from past-tense sentences in this respect.
Again, the issue of assertibility is analogous in this respect. In
order to explain the apparent assertibility of some future contingents,
the incompatibilist might appeal to some familiar non-factive act other
than assertion — guess, prediction, or conjecture — or define a tailor-
made substitute for assertion. But in order for such a claim to be
minimally credible, some general revisionary account of assertive
utterances must be provided. As Hattiangadi and Besson have argued,
this is not an easy task.21
Further qualms concern the internal coherence of this option. Con-
sider the first version of the strategy, which replaces knowledge with
belief. For any contingent p, (I) entails that p is not true. But then it
must be wrong to believe p, because to believe p is to believe that p is
true, or so is reasonable to assume. Thus it must be wrong to believe
(1). Yet it does not seem wrong to believe (1). More dramatically,
suppose that A knows that p is contingent, and that A endorses (I).
Then it seems that A cannot coherently believe p, for (I) entails that
p is not true. The incompatibilist might certainly deny that belief is
linked to truth in the way assumed. But some independent argument
would be needed to support such a move.22
The second version of the strategy, which replaces knowledge with
justification, is less problematic, because it would make little sense to
say that it is wrong to have a justification for p when p is not true. Still,
it is not entirely obvious that the appeal to justification squares with
(I). Suppose, as before, that A knows that p is contingent, and that
A endorses (I). Then it is not clear how A can hold that p is justified,
since (I) entails that p is not true. One thing is to have a justified belief
which happens to be untrue, quite another thing is to have a belief
and take it to be justified and untrue. Of course, justification may be
understood in more than one way, and there is no overt inconsistency
in a situation of the second kind. But at least on some understanding
of justification, recognizing that p is not true implies reconsidering
one’s reasons for p.
Similar considerations hold for the third version of the strategy,
which replaces knowledge with probability. If A knows that p is con-
tingent, and A endorses (I), then A must hold that p is probable and
untrue, which seems at odds with the idea that the probability of p is
the probability of its truth. A further doubt might be raised in connec-
tion with this version. Although knowledge and probability seem to
go together in the examples considered, in that (1)-(3) apparently in-
volve both knowledge and probablity while (5)-(7) apparently involve
21 Hattiangadi and Besson [9], p. 268-270, [6], pp. 497-499.
22 Cariani and Santorio [8], pp. 137-138, and Santelli [32], p. 19, suggest that (I) entails
that it is wrong to believe future contingents.
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neither of them, there are cases in which knowledge and probability
do not go together. Consider the following sentence:
(12) Tomorrow nobody will throw eggs at my window
Although the probability of (12) is very high, it does not seem that I
know (12). If I utter (12) in a conversation with a person, that person
might naturally ask “How can you say that? You don’t know it!”.
Similar examples come from lottery cases. Suppose that I buy a ticket
in a lottery and I utter the following sentence:
(13) My ticket will not win
Although the probability of (13) can be extremely high, this does not
necessarily mean that I know (13). Or at least, such ascription of
knowledge is controversial.23
More generally, it may be argued that probabilty and knowledge
differ in the sense that there is a significant mismatch between the
class of cases in which the event described is probable and that in
which the corresponding ascription of knowledge is plausible. So it is
not clear that the difference between the cases in which it seems that
we know that things will go a certain way and those in which it seems
that we lack such knowledge can be explained in terms of distinction
between the cases in which it is probable that things will go a certain
way and those in which it is not.
5 ignored possibilities
The third option is to say that ‘A knows p’ seems true only insofar
as we ignore some possibilities that are relevant given A’s epistemic
condition: once such possibilities are considered, it becomes clear that
A does not really know p. Thus, my apparent knowledge of (1) is
explained by the fact that I’m ignoring the possibility that a tsetse fly
bites me. But when that possibility is taken into account, it becomes
clear that I do not know (1). More generally, the incompatibilist might
argue that our apparent knowledge of future contingents is elusive in
the sense suggested by Lewis: as soon as we examine it, straightaway
it vanishes.24
This line of argument is less compelling than it may seem. First
of all, the best way to make sense of the elusiveness claim suggested
is to construe it as a claim that specifically concerns future contin-
gents, rather than as a claim that follows from a general view about
23 Armstrong [2], pp. 185-188, Lewis [18], p. 551, DeRose [7], Williamson [44], p. 249,
among others, claim that we lack knowledge in the lottery case. Similar considerations
hold for assertibility. For example, (12) and (13) are highly probable, but this does
not necessarily make them assertible. It may be argued, as in Williamson [44], p. 246,
that high probability by itself does not imply assertibility.
24 Lewis [18], p. 560.
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knowledge. Lewis has defended such a view. According to him, A
knows p if and only if A’s evidence eliminates every possibility in
which not-p, except for those possibilities that are properly ignored.
Since what is and what is not ignored is a feature of the context, and
when a possibility is not ignored, ipso facto is not properly ignored,
for every possibility that is properly ignored in a context, there are
contexts in which the same possibility is not properly ignored. If the
incompatibilist adopted this view, that is, if the point were simply
that there are contexts in which the possibility of the tsetse fly is not
properly ignored, then the same point would apply to any ascription
of knowledge, including ‘I know that I have hands’. If all knowledge
is elusive in Lewis’ sense, the elusiveness of my knowledge of (1) does
not depend on its future contingency.
Let it be granted, then, that the problem with ascriptions of knowl-
edge involving future contingents does not reduce to there being
contexts in which such ascriptions are false. In this case, the incompat-
ibilist must say that ‘A knows p’ is false in every context, or at least in
the ordinary contexts in which it seems true. The main problem with
this move is that the suggested explanation of the falsity of ‘A knows p’
implies that the possibilities ignored are relevant given A’s epistemic
condition, which is disputable. Unless independent arguments are
provided, it cannot be taken for granted that the possibilities that we
ignore in the cases in which it seems that we know that things will go
a certain way are improperly ignored. In the example considered, it is
questionable that the possibility that a tsetse fly bites me is improperly
ignored.
As Lewis himself obvserves, it is plausible to think that there is a
reliability rule according to which, whenever we employ a process or
method that is fairly reliable, we can properly presuppose that the pro-
cess or method works without a glitch in the case under consideration.
In accordance with this rule, it may be argued that there are cases in
which it is proper to ignore some possibilities when we predict that
things will go a certain way.25
Of course, not all ignored possibilities belong to this category.
More generally, not all ignored possibilities are properly ignored. But
the point is precisely that the delimitation of the class of properly
ignored possibilities requires substantive theoretical work. So it is an
open question whether the possibilities that are ignored in the cases
in which it seems that A knows p really prevent A from knowing p.
6 ockhamism
The foregoing sections show that the difference problem besets incom-
patibilism with difficulties that deserve careful consideration. This is
not to say that they are insurmontable difficulties, or that none of the
25 Lewis [18], p. 558.
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possible solutions discussed can work. Perhaps the intuitive contrast
between (1)-(3) and (5)-(7) might be explained in terms of justification,
in accordance with the proposal outlined in section 4. But in that case
the incompatibilist should provide independent arguments for the
intended reformulation, and spell out a suitable notion of justification.
So the details of the story would still be missing. More generally, even
though the difference problem may not be a decisive reason against
incompatibilism, there is no obvious solution to it.
The aim of the rest of the paper is to sketch a compatibilist view
of future contingents which accords with (K). The idea that underlies
the view is that one of the possible futures is the actual future, that
is, the way things will go. This idea was developed by Ockham
in his Tractatus de praedestinatione et praescientia Dei respectu futurorum
contingentibus, which is intended to explain how divine foreknowledge
is compatible with the contingency of events. If there is such a thing as
the actual future, then a principled distinction can be drawn between
plain truth, defined as truth in the actual future, and determinate
truth, defined as truth in all possible futures. So it turns out that
future contingents are true or false, even though they are neither
determinately true nor determinately false.26
Ockhamism is consistent with different metaphysical conceptions.
At least two basic distinctions must be taken into account in order to
spell out the relation between the actual future and the other possible
futures. The first is between real possibilities and ersatz possibilities:
possible futures, just as the histories to which they belong, can be
understood either as concrete entities that exist in the most fundamen-
tal sense, or as abstract entities built from sentences, propositions, or
other kinds of actual items. The second is between branching and diver-
gence: one thing is to claim that histories can overlap, as in figure 1, so
that two distinct possible futures can share a single past, quite another
thing is to claim that histories are entirely disconnected totalities, as in





26 Ockham [28], pp. 515-517. This view is elaborated and defended in Øhrstrøm [29],







In the literature on future contingents, Ockhamism is often associ-
ated with the view that the actual future is a distinguished member
of a set of real possible futures that branch for a single past. So, for
example, in the case of figure 1 the idea is that h1 and h2 are equally
real, but one of them, say h1, is the actual history. This view, also
known as the thin red line, has been mainly discussed by the opponents
of Ockhamism.27
However, neither real possibilities nor branching are essential to
Ockhamism. As far as the Ockhamist analysis of truth is concerned,
non-actual futures can equally be conceived as ersatz possibilities. Ar-
guably, it is not even necessary that the actual future itself is assumed
to be real in the same sense in which the present is real. Of course, it
might be contended that ersatz branching is not “real” branching. But
then the question becomes whether there are reasons to value “real”
branching per se.28
The alternative to branching is divergence. In this case the idea
is that we have a single future because we belong to a single history,
the actual history, although other histories are exactly like our history
up to the present. Thus, figure 2 can be taken to represent the actual
history, say h1, and a wholly distinct history that is exactly like h1 up
to a certain point. As in the case of figure 1, h2 can be understood
either as a real possibility or an ersatz possibility. Lewis has advocated
divergence in a metaphysical framework where possible worlds are
taken to be just as real as the actual world. But it is not necessary
to buy the whole of Lewis’s metaphysics in order to accommodate
Ockhamism.29
27 The expression ‘thin red line’ goes back to Belnap and Green [4]. The view is
discussed in Belnap, Perloff and Xu [26], and in MacFarlane [20], among other works.
Some of their objections are countered in Rosenkranz [31], Borghini and Torrengo [5],
Iacona [12].
28 Iacona [13] provides a thorough discussion of the metaphysical views consistent with
Ockhamism.
29 Lewis [17], p. 206.
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7 the metaphor of openness
Although Ockhamism has received growing attention lately, it is far
from being popular. The main worry that has been raised in connection
with it is that the very notion of future actuality seems at odds with
the widely accepted claim that the future is open. However, I believe
that this worry is ungrounded. The claim that the future is open can
be understood in more than one way, and it is questionable that the
most plausible interpretations of it are inconsistent with Ockhamsim.
Independently of whether non-actual histories are real or ersatz
possibilities, or whether they branch or diverge, Ockhamism leaves
room for at least three plausible readings of the metaphor of openness.
A first option is to define openness in terms of existence of alternative
possibilities: to say that the future is open is to say that, for some p,
both p and not-p are possible. This interpretation equates the claim
that the future is open with the negation of fatalism, the doctrine
that no future event is contingent. If openness is defined in terms of
existence of alternative possibilities, the claim that the future is open
is clearly consistent with Ockhamism, for it boils down to the claim
that some p is neither determinately true nor determinately false.
A second option is to define openness in terms of indetermination,
understood as absence of determination: to say that the future is open
is to say that nothing determines the future. Determination may be
defined as a relation between states: given a state S that obtains at time
t0 and given a state S′ that obtains at time t1, S determines S′ if and
only if the obtaining of S at t0, together with the laws of nature, entails
that S′ obtains at t1. If openness is defined in terms of indetermination,
the claim that the future is open is clearly consistent with Ockhamism,
for future actuality does not entail determination: the actual future
can instantiate two states S and S′ such that S does not determine S′.
A third option is to define openness in terms of our capacity to
cause future events. For example, if I set the alarm of my phone at 6
am, the sound that the phone will emit tomorrow morning is an effect
of the movements that I perform tonight. Clearly, the past does not
depend on us in this sense, because our present actions do not have
past effects. No matter whether I set the alarm or not, what happened
yesterday remains the same. If openness is understood this way, the
claim that the future is open is clearly consistent with Ockhamism, for
it makes perfect sense to say that an event which occurs in the actual
history at a given time causes another event that occurs in the actual
history at a later time.30
The three interpretations considered do not exhaust the possible
readings of the metaphor of openness, and one can surely find some
other interpretation that differs from them and contradicts Ockhamism.
30 As Lewis [16] suggests, the asymmetry between future and past can be described in
terms of counterfactual dependence.
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In particular, if one is a branching purist who thinks that temporal
reality is constituted by plurality of overlapping worlds that are equal
in all respects, one may be apt to identify openness with this very
conception.31
The problem with such an interpretation, however, is that it is
too theoretically loaded to be regarded as purely intuitive. Whatever
our intuitions about the future may be, they are not as specific and
fine-grained as to settle the question whether possible worlds overlap.
The nature of possible worlds and the relations between them are
matter of metaphysical controversy. Therefore, an appeal to openness
so understood can hardly be used against Ockhamism as if it were an
appeal to the intuition of openness.32
Branching purists, however, tend to reason in this way when they
dismiss Ockhamism — or the thin red line — as an untenable variant
of their own conception. In order to illustrate the frailty of their
misgivings, we will consider two examples. The first is drawn from
Belnap, Perloff, and Xu:
What in the structure of our world could determine a
single possibility from among all the others to be ‘actual’?
As far as we know, there is nothing in any science that
would help. To the extent that scientific theories require
objective possibilities for the future, there is no hint that
those theories pick out a Thin Red Line.33
This negative remark is misguided in at least two respects. First, the
appeal to scientific theories is out of place here, for scientific theories
— just like intuitions — do not settle the main metaphysical questions
about the future. In particular, they do not indicate branching purism
as the best metaphysical view. As far as scientific theories are con-
cerned, the metaphysical options considered in section 6 are all equally
admissible. Second, future actuality does not entail determination,
as noted above: something can belong to the actual future without
being determined. One thing is to say that a given history is the actual
history, quite another thing is to say that something in the structure of
the world determines it to be actual. The first claim does not entail
the second. Once the suspicion of determination is dispelled, asking
the Ockhamist why the actual history is actual, rather than merely
possible, is like asking anyone else why the actual world is actual,
rather than merely possible.
The second example, drawn from McArthur and MacFarlane, is
the objection according to which if one of the branches of the tree is
the actual history, it is no longer clear how the other branches can
represent genuine possibilities:
31 MacFarlane [20], and Spolaore and Gallina [34] adopt a definition along these lines.
32 Torre [39], pp. 367-368, contains some remarks along these lines.
33 Belnap, Perloff, and Xu [26], p. 162.
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But, in our view, allowing any state to already be marked
as that which will become actual, or as that state which
is (atemporally) actual, reintroduces the linear conception,
because it denies that the other states are real alternatives.34
I hold that positing a thin red line amounts to giving up
objective indeterminism. The non-red branches in the tree
are supposed to represent objectively possible futures, but
their non-redness indicates precisely that they will not be
the continuations of the history that includes the utterance
in question. [...] In what sense, then, are the others really
‘possibilities’?35
This objection is misguided as well. Consider figure 1. Let f1 and f2 be
the non-overlapping segments of h1 and h2 respectively, and suppose
as before that h1 is the actual history. It is certainly legitimate to ask
whether f2 is a genuine continuation of the part of h1 that precedes
f1. But a negative answer to this question is not to be confused with
the claim that f2 is not a a genuine possibility. The mere non-actuality
of f2 does not prevent it from being possible, just as the fact that I’m
not actually lying on a beach does not prevent such a state of affairs
from being possible. So, there is a clear sense in which positing a
thin red line does not amount to giving up objective indeterminism.
Perhaps it amounts to giving up “real” branching. But then, as noted
in section 6, the question becomes whether there are reasons to value
“real” branching per se. Branching purists cannot take for granted
that branching and indeterminism are the same thing, because the
Ockhamist is under no obligation to agree on this point.36
8 true ascriptions of knowledge
Ockhamism is consistent with (K). As we have seen, incompatibilism
is at odds with (K) because there is a valid reasoning that goes from
(I) and (F) to the negation of (K). Ockhamism blocks that reasoning
because it rejects (I). So it does not require revisionary strategies such
as those discussed in sections 3-5. The observation that in some cases
it seems that we know that things will go a certain way must not be
explained away in terms of a systematic paraphrase of the sentences
of the form ‘A knows p’, for it can be granted that some sentences of
that form are literally true.
In order to illustrate this point, I will assume divergence, leaving
unspecified whether non-actual histories are real or ersatz possibilities.
Consider figure 3, and let h1 be the actual history. h1 and h2 include
34 McArthur [24], p. 284.
35 MacFarlane [20], p. 325.
36 Iacona [11] provides a detailed discussion of the main objections to Ockhamism,
including those just considered.
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two distinct presents, m1 and m2. Assuming that there is an absolute
temporal axis, that is, that time can be measured from a point of
view that is external to the histories, we can say that m1 and m2 are
located at the same point along that axis. If we call instant an absolute
temporal unit, definable as a set of equivalent moments, we can say
that m1 and m2 are in the same instant, i0. This instant is represented







Figure 3: Two pasts, two presents, two futures
It is important to note that being in a given history does not
mean being in a position to discern that history from other histories.
Suppose that h1 and h2 are exactly alike up to i0, and that a person A
is in m1. For A, m1 is indistinguishable from m2, and the same goes
for any pair of moments in any instant that precedes i0. This is to
say that A is not in a position to know whether the actual history is
h1 or h2. If some event occurs in h1 after m1 but does not occur in h2
after m2, A is not in a position to know whether the occurrence of that
event belongs to the actual history. In a way, we do not know what
will happen because we do not know where we are.
Now suppose that h1 and h2 are exactly alike up to i0, as before,
and that some specific difference between h1 and h2 that matters to the
truth of p is located at an instant i1 later than i0. Imagine for example
that i0 is today, i1 is tomorrow, and p is a statement uttered today
about some event that can occur tomorrow. In figure 4, m1 and m2
are qualitatively identical moments, while m3 and m4 are qualitatively
different moments: m3 makes p true, while m4 makes it false. This is
to say that p is true relative to h1, and false relative to h2. Whether p
is true or false simpliciter depends on which of the two histories is the
actual history. In any case, p is either true or false, even though it is
neither determinately true nor determinately false.
In a situation of this kind it is conceivable that p is true, and that a
person A, at i0, satisfies the epistemic condition — whatever it may be
— that is required to know p. So it can be the case that ‘A knows p’ is
true. Cases 1-3 are precisely situations of this kind. For example, it














Figure 4: Two todays and two tomorrows
true in the actual history, and I have all that is required to know (1).
Similar considerations hold for (2) and (3).
9 reasonable ascriptions of knowledge
As we have seen, (K) owes its initial plausibility to the fact that some
sentences of the form ‘A knows p’ seem true even though p is con-
tingent. The foregoing sections suggest that there is a coherent way
to claim that some of these sentences are really true. However, it is
important to understand that this claim does not entail that all the
apparently true sentences of the form ‘A knows p’ are really true.
Any person B who ascribes knowledge of p to A can have at most
a defeasible warrant to think that p is true. So it can happen that B
rationally believes that A knows p but p is false. Since knowledge
entails truth, the cases of this kind are cases in which A does not know
p, so B’s ascription is false. Of course, this also holds when A and B
are the same person: it can happen that A rationally believes that A
knows p but p is false.
Consider case 1. When I utter (1) it seems that I know what I say.
But I cannot rule out the possibility that a tsetse fly bites me. Suppose
that h1 and h2 are qualitatively identical up to i0, as in figure 4, and
that I utter (1) at i0. Suppose also that i1 is tomorrow at 6 am, that m3
is the predictable moment in which I wake up, and m4 is the unlikely
scenario in which I remain in bed because of the tsetse fly. In this
case, I’m unable to tell whether I’m in h1 or in h2. If I am in h1, as is
reasonable to believe, then I really know (1). If instead I am in h2, then
I do not know (1).
Similar considerations hold for cases 2 and 3. Although it seems
that you know (2), it can happen that the projectionist is late, hence that
you do not really know (2). Similarly, although it seems that Mrs Green
knows (3), it can happen that Mr Brown has an unexpected visitor,
hence that Mrs Green does not really know (3). More generally, for
any case in which it seems that ‘A knows p’ is true, it can happen that
‘A knows p’ is false because p is false. This explains why retrospective
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ascriptions of knowledge are intuitively incorrect when p turns out to
be false, as noted in section 3.
But then, if we cannot take for granted that all the apparently
true sentences of the form ‘A knows p’ are really true, how can we
account for their apparent truth? The answer is that the cases in
which ‘A knows p’ seems true are cases in which the ascription of
knowledge is reasonable. Consider case 1. Since it is very probable on
my present evidence that I know (1), it is reasonable for me to believe
that I know (1). Of course, if a tsetse fly bites me, I don’t really know
(1). But this does not prevent my self-ascription of knowledge from
being reasonable. Similar considerations hold for cases 2 and 3. The
intuitive distinction between (1)-(3) and (5)-(7) lies in the fact that it is
reasonable to think that we know (1)-(3) while it is not reasonable to
think that we know (5)-(7).
More generally, suppose that it is very probable on B’s evidence
that A knows p, but that B is not in a position to tell whether A really
knows p or A falsely but reasonably believes p. Then it is reasonable
for B to ascribe knowledge to A, independently of whether A really
knows p. If A and B are the same person, this means that it is reason-
able for A to make a self-ascription of knowledge, independently of
whether the ascription is actually true.
Note that the explanation just outlined is largely neutral as to the
question of what is knowledge. On any account of knowledge, A
knows p just in case some suitably defined condition C obtains, where
C entails that p is true. All that needs be assumed here is that the cases
in which it seems that we have knowledge — such as cases 1-3 — are
cases in which it is reasonable to think that C obtains, independently
of whether p is actually true, while the cases in which it seems that
we lack knowledge are cases in which it is not reasonable to think that
C obtains. This assumption is consistent with different accounts of
knowledge.
10 the kk principle
A further issue concerns second-order knowledge. According to a
widely debated principle, second-order knowledge follows from first-
order knowledge:
(KK) If one knows p, then one knows that one knows p
Since the explanation outlined in the foregoing section is largely
neutral as to the question of what knowledge is, the same goes for the
question whether (KK) holds, given that the latter question essentially
depends on the former. For at least some account of knowledge
consistent with (K), it can happen that one knows p without knowing
that one knows p.
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Suppose that it is very probable on A’s evidence that A knows p,
but that A is not in a position to tell whether p is true or A falsely but
reasonably believes p. Suppose in addition that p is true, so that A
really knows p. It is an open question whether in such circumstance
A knows that A knows p. Consider again case 1, in which it is very
probable on my present evidence that I know (1) but I’m unable to
tell whether (1) is really true or I falsely but reasonably believe (1).
Now suppose that (1) is true, so that I really know (1). It is an open
question whether in such circumstance I know that I know (1), given
that I’m not in a position to rule out that a tsetse fly will bite me.
The possible failure of (KK) constitutes a further limitation that
must be taken into account in order to fully grasp the knowability the-
sis. Any plausible defence of (K) must recognize that our knowledge
of future contingents is limited in at least two respects. First, for every
case in which it seems that we know p, it can happen that we do not
p because p is false. Second, it cannot even be taken for granted that,
when we know p, we are in a position to know that we know p.
When Ockham argued that divine foreknowledge is compatible
with the contingency of events, he conceived of God’s intelligence as
a perfect faculty free from such limitations. For every contingent p,
God knows p. Otherwise, there would be something that God does
not know. Moreover, for every contingent p such that God knows p,
God also knows that he knows p. Otherwise, again, there would be
something that God does not know. We are definitely unlike God in
the first respect because we are totally ignorant about many future
contingents. But we might also be unlike God in the second respect:
we might be unable to discern the future contingents we know from
those we do not know.
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699, 2009.
[28] W. Ockham. Tractatus de praedestinatione et de praescientia
dei respectu futurorum contingentibus. In Opera philosophica et
theologica, volume II. The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure,
New York, 1978.
[29] P. Øhrstrøm. In Defence of the Thin Red Line: a case for Ock-
hamism. Humana Mente, 8:17–32, 2009.
[30] A. N. Prior. Past, Present and Future. Clarendon Press, Oxford,
1967.
[31] S. Rosenkranz. In Defence of Ockhamism. Philosophia, 40:617–31,
2012.
[32] A. Santelli. Future contingents, Branching Time and Assertion.
Philosophia, 2020.
[33] R. K. Scheer. Knowledge of the future. Mind, 80:212–226, 1971.
[34] G. Spolaore and F. Gallina. The Actual Future is Open. Erkenntnis,
2018.
[35] I. Stojanovic. Talking about the future: Unsettled truth and
assertion. In P. De Brabanter, M. Kissine, and S. Sharifzadeh,
editor, Future Times, Future Tenses. Oxford University Press, 2014.
23
[36] R. H. Thomason. Combinations of Tense and Modality. In
D. Gabbay and G. Guenthner, editors, Handbook of Philosophical
Logic, volume 2, pages 135–165. Reidel, Dordrecht, 1984.
[37] P. Todd. On Behalf of a Mutable Future. Synthese, 193:2077–2095,
2016.
[38] P. Todd and B. Rabern. Future Contingents and the Logic of
Temporal Omniscience. Noûs, 55:102–127, 2021.
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